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SERVICE OF PROCESS-FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE-Service of Process in Italy on 
Alien Corporate Defendant Permitted in a 
Federal Antitrust Action-Hoffman 
Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A.. * 
Plaintiff, an American automobile distributor, brought suit in 
a federal court in the Southern District of New York against Alfa 
Romeo S.p.A., an Italian corporation, for violation of the Robin-
son-Patman1 and Auto Dealers' Acts.2 Service of process was made 
personally on defendant's general manager in Italy by an Italian 
attorney appointed for that purpose by the district court, and by 
registered mail as prescribed by the New York statute for extra-
territorial service.8 Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction as to the Robinson-Patman claim on the ground that 
section 12 of the Clayton Act limits the territorial reach of process 
under the antitrust laws to the United States.4 Dismissal was also 
• 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
1. 49 Stat. 1526 (1986), 15 U.S.C. § Ill (1964). 
2. 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964). Defendant's American subsid-
iary and one of its officers were also parties. Other claims were made which are 
not of immediate interest. 
ll. N.Y. CIV. PRA.c. I.Aw §§ 802, 311, 318. For a discussion of the expansive treat-
ment of this statute by the New York state courts, see Note, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 377 (1966). 
See id. at 878, for a partial list of other state long-arm statutes. 
4. Clayton Act § 12, 38 Stat. 786 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1964), provides in part: 
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation 
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, 
but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all 
process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, 
or wherever it may be found. 
The term "antitrust laws" as defined in § 1 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 780 (1914), 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964), includes the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 
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sought of both the Robinson-Patman and the Auto Dealers' Act 
claims on the ground that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure does not authorize service to be made pursuant to state long-
arm statutes in antitrust cases.5 Held, motion denied. Service of 
process in a Robinson-Patman Act claim on a party residing out-
side the United States is authorized by section 12 of the Clayton 
Act, and, alternatively, such service is permitted by Rule 4(e) to 
be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute. Personal. jurisdiction 
in an Auto Dealers' Act claim may also be acquired under Rule 4(e) 
when service is made in the manner prescribed in a state statute. 
The court's holding as to the territorial reach of process under 
section 12 of the Clayton Act is an effort to clarify a problem created 
by dicta in previous cases which had interpreted that section as 
permitting service to be made only in a judicial district of the 
United States.6 This interpretation had been made notwithstanding 
the language of the section which provides that all process may 
be served on a corporate defendant "wherever it may be found." 7 
In concluding that no reason could be advanced for limiting the 
statute in such a manner,8 the court has not only given effect to the 
letter of section 12, but it has also, through its interpretation, 
brought section 12 into line with other similarly worded provisions 
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1964), parts of the Wilson Tariff Act, 28 Stat. 570 
(1894), as amended,. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-9, 11 (1964), an act amending the Wilson Tariff 
Act, 37 Stat. 667 (1913), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1964), and the Clayton Act itself 
which was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 13 (1964). See Nashville Mill< Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). 
The Auto Dealers' Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964), is not 
included within the term "antitrust laws" and, hence, is not subject to the service 
of process provisions of section 12 of the Clayton Act. See Schnabel v. Volkswagen 
of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1960). 
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) provides: 
'Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder 
provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of 
summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which 
the district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in 
the manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein 
prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever 
a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides 
(1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons 
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service 
upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason 
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located 
within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances 
and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule. 
6. In United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 817 (1948) the court said that 
"process could not be issued to run for such corporations to the foreign countries 
of which they are 'inhabitants'." See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo 
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 373 (1927). 
7. See note 4 supra. 
8. Principal case at 79-80. 
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which have been held to authorize service of process outside the 
United States.9 
The more important aspect of the principal case, however, re-
volves around the court's use of Rule 4, first, as an alternative 
ground to section 12 to uphold personal jurisdiction on the Robin-
son-Patman Act claims, and, second, as a ground for sustaining ser-
vice on the Auto Dealers' Act claim. In both instances the court 
relied on the fact that service was made pursuant to a state long-
arm statute. Since Rule 4(e) permits service in the manner pre-
scribed by such a statute, jurisdiction was sustained. The use of 
the state service of process procedure in the principal case was 
made possible by the 1963 Amendments to the Federal Rules, which 
amendments were promulgated in part to clarify how state long-
arm statutes may be used for obtaining extraterritorial service of 
process in federal courts.10 Rule 4(d)(7), which had earlier been 
held to authorize extraterritorial service under non-resident mo-
torist and long-arm statutes,11 was amended so as to clearly limit its 
prescription of the manner of service to persons within the forum 
state.12 Rule 4(e), which had permitted extraterritorial service only 
as prescribed by a federal statute authorizing extraterritorial ser-
vice, 18 was amended to allow service in the manner and under the 
cirmumstances outlined in either a relevant federal or state statute 
or rule.14 Rule 4(£) had permitted service to be made only within 
9. See SEC v. Briggs, 2!14 F. Supp. 618 (N.D. Ohio 1964), interpreting the service 
provisions of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77(v)(a) 
(1964), and the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78(aa) (1964), to allow process to run outside the United States. See also H.R. REP. 
No. 85, 7!1d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (19!13). 
10. See Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. General Elec. Co., 35 
F.R.D. 131, 133-34 (N.D. ID. 1964). 
11. Initially, Rule 4(d)(7) was used to effect service on non-resident defendants 
through the Secretary of State of the forum when there was a non-resident motorist 
statute in effect. See, e.g., Giffin v. Ensign, 234 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 1956), 70 HARv. L. 
R.Ev. 729 (1957). But see McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir.) (concurring opinion), 
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953). Later the Rule was also used to allow service pur-
suant to a more general long-arm statute which permitted service directly on a de-
fendant outside the forum state. See, e.g., Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc., 24 
F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1959). See also 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1f 4.19 (1965) [here-
inafter cited as MooRE]; Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 196I-196J (I), 77 HARv. L. R.Ev. 601, 619-22 (1964). 
12. See ADVISORY COMMITIEE NOTES ro nm RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR nm 
UNITED STATES DISTRicr COURTS (1963), reproduced in 3A BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, FED• 
ERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE 119, 120 (Wright ed. 1965 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as 
ADVISORY COMMllTEE]. The Advisory Committee cites 2 MooRE «J 4.32 for this propo-
sition. 
13. See generally 2 MooRE ,r 4.32(1). 
14. For the effect of the 1963 amendments on FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e), see generally 2 
MOORE 'J 4.32(2). It seems clear that Rule 4(e) now replaces former Rule 4(d)(7) in 
dealing with extraterritorial process. See 2 MOORE ,r 4.31, at 1220; Kaplan, supra note 
11, at 621. For the text of present Rule 4(e), see note 5 supra. 
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the forum state, with the exception that extraterritorial service 
could be made if specifically authorized by a federal statute. This 
exception was broadened so as to allow process to be served out-
side the state if authorized either by a United States statute or the 
Federal Rules,15 thus permitting service in the manner prescribed 
in state statutes or rules as authorized in Rule 4(e). In sum, the 
amendments gave to the party seeking to make service an option 
of proceeding under either federal or state procedures where both 
were applicable.16 
Defendant in the principal case, however, argued that Rule 4(e) 
allows extraterritorial service pursuant to state long-arm statutes 
only in cases where federal and state courts have concurrent juris-
diction. This argument was based on the language permitting such 
service only "under the circumstances" prescribed in the state 
statute. Since one of the circumstances of applicability, it was 
argued, was that the type of action being brought must be cog-
nizable in the state court, service in a case of peculiarly federal 
cognizance could not be made "under the circumstances" provided 
in the state statute.17 This restrictive interpretation has not only 
been rejected by the courts which have interpreted Rule 4(e) since 
its amendment in 1963,18 but it does not comport with the inter-
pretations of other statutory phrases similar to "under the circum-
stances."19 It appears, therefore, that Rule 4(e) deals only with the 
manner of service20 and the amenability to service of a defend-
15. For a list of United States statutes covered by the exception of Rule 4(£), see 
2 MOORE ,r 4.42(1). The amendment of the first sentence of subdivision (f) was made 
"to assure the effectiveness of service outside the territorial limits of the state in 
all cases in which any of the rules authorize service beyond those boundaries." AD• 
VJSORY COJUMIITEE 121. 
16. See 2 MooRE ,r 4.32(2), at 1235, where it is stated concerning the second sen-
tence of Rule 4(e): 
It will be seen that this clause parallels the first sentence • • • and the rule now 
permits service to be made • • • under the circumstances and in the manner 
prescribed either by a federal statute or by a statute or rule of the state in 
which the district court is held. 
The Advisory Committee's Notes state: "If the circumstances of a particular case 
satisfy the applicable State law • • • , the party seeking to make the service may 
proceed under the Federal or the State law, at his option." ADVISORY COMMIITEE 121. 
17. Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Relief Pursuant 
to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Principal case. 
18. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 131, 135-36 (N.D. m. 1964). 
The Montreal Trust case was reheard by the trial court which set aside service on 
other grounds. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 235 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
The order setting aside service was reversed and the cause remanded. United States 
v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); see 1 
:BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 182.1 n. 56.17 (Wright ed. 
1965 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HOLTZOFF]. 
19. See, e.g., Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895) (refusing to recognize the 
cognizability element in a statute providing that state statutes could be used "in 
cases where they apply"). 
20, United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd 
on other grounds, 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 919 (1966); United 
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ant21 who is subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In no way does it 
involve subject matter jurisdiction. 
While it ultimately reached the correct decision in sustaining 
jurisdiction, the court's treatment of the personal jurisdiction issue 
is subject to criticism, for it never indicates the statutory basis upon 
which the defendant was found to be subject to the jurisdiction of 
the court. When service is to be made in a federal question case, 
there must be some federal statute which prescribes the basis for 
personal jurisdiction so that service on a person is authorized. 
Proper bases for venue were found in section 12 of the Clayton Act 
and in section 2 of the Auto Dealers' Act.22 But instead of at-
tributing to these sections the capacity to serve as jurisdictional 
foundations, the court seemingly indicated that it was Rule 4(e) 
which constituted the requisite base.23 However, since the Federal 
Rules prescribe only the manner of service and the reach of process 
and do not and cannot provide the jurisdictional base, it appears 
that if the statutes themselves were not at least in part jurisdic-
tional, there would be no basis for the assertion of personal juris-
diction over the defendant in the principal case. 
Thus, although the manner of service is subject to the plaintiff's 
option, there is only one statute which could provide a basis for 
jurisdiction-the Clayton Act. In order to sustain jurisdiction un-
der the Clayton Act, however, it is necessary to say that although 
section 12 reads like a venue statute,24 it may also be interpreted as 
a basis for personal jurisdiction. Such an interpretation is plausible 
in light of the last clause of the section which permits service to be 
made wherever the defendant may be found. By placing the venue 
and service provisions in the same section, Congress has, according 
to some courts,25 afforded a basis for and a means of acquiring per-
sonal jurisdiction. 
Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of America, 237 F. Supp. 971, 981 (D. Del. 1964); 1 
BARRON &: HOLTZOFF § 182.1. 
21. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., supra note 20, at 219; 1 BARRON &: HoLT-
ZOFF § 182.1. 
22. Principal case at 75-77. 
23. Principal case at 80. This conclusion is derived from the fact that the court 
held that service pursuant to the New York long-arm statute under the Rule was 
adequate to sustain jurisdiction over the defendants even if section 12 was not. 
24. For the text of § 12, see note 4 supra. 
25. In United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948) the court distinguished 
between the functions of each of the two clauses of section 12. 
Although difference of that sort [inability to serve process in all districts 
where venue is proper] may appear to be generally incongruous, since ordinarily 
it would seem that susceptibility to suit in a district should be accompanied by 
amenability to process there, such things are for Congress' determination as mat-
ters of policy relating to the scope and correlation, or lack of it, of venue and 
service provisions. 
Id. at 809 n.21. Thus, it would seem that the Scophony Court equated the venue provi-
sion of § 12 with susceptibility to suit. However, the Court also seems to realize that 
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Since section 12 of the Clayton Act does not apply to Auto 
Dealers' Act claims, 26 personal jurisdiction must be based on some 
provision within the latter act itself. However, the provisions of 
the Auto Dealers' Act are somewhat more troublesome than those 
of the Clayton Act. Section 2 of the Auto Dealers' Act, like the 
first clause of section 12, appears at a cursory reading to be a venue 
provision.27 Unlike section 12, however, section 2 contains no provi-
sion for service of process from which combination a Congressional 
intent to provide a jurisdictional base could be distilled. N everthe-
less, it would seem that the very passage of the Auto Dealers' Act 
evidences an intent that parties bringing actions under the Act 
would be able to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants charged 
with violations so as to be able to prosecute claims. The most rea-
sonable interpretation of section 2, therefore, is that it alone, like 
section 12, serves as the jurisdictional base of the statute.28 Once a 
basis for personal jurisdiction is established, the plaintiff may pro-
ceed under Rule 4(e) to serve process in the manner and under the 
circumstances prescribed in a state long-arm statute-the ultimate 
result in the principal case. 
The lack of a service provision in the Auto Dealers' Act also 
illustrates a major problem in the implementation of Rule 4(e), 
that is, the possibility that service procedures on claims under the 
Act will not be uniform throughout the United States. The exis-
tence of liberal service provisions in such statutes as the Clayton 
Act and the Securities Exchange Act29 allows a plaintiff to serve 
the venue provision of § 12 can only serve as a basis for quasi-jurisdiction when it 
says: ".But there can be no question of the existence of 'jurisdiction,' in the sense 
of venue under section 12 •.• ," Id. at 810. Thus, the Court implicitly assigns to 
the venue provision of § 12 the task of serving as a jurisdictional base, in the 
absence of a true jurisdictional provision. Section 12 was also spoken of as a juris• 
dictional base in Northern Ky. Tel. Co. v. Southern .Bell Tel. &: Tel. Co., 54 F.2d 
107, 108 (E.D. Ky. 1931) (transaction of business in the district of venue gave the 
court jurisdiction of the action). See also United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 
334 U.S. 573 (1948). 
26. Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1960); 
see note 4 supra. 
27. Auto Dealers' Act § 2, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964), provides 
in part: 
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer 
engaged in commerce, in any district court of the United States in the district 
in which said manufacturer resides, or is found, or has an agent, without respect 
to the amount in controversy • • . . 
28. The court in the principal case found venue proper because defendant was 
doing business and had an agent in the state. Principal case at 73. Jurisdiction would 
be sustained on the same grounds. If the defendant had had no agent, the fact 
that he systematically did business within the state might have been a sufficient 
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, as it has been held that a corporation is found 
in a state if it does business within that state. Raul Int'l Corp. v. Nu-Era Gear 
Corp., 28 F.R.D. 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
29. See note 9 supra. 
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process outside the forum state pursuant to the first sentence of 
Rule 4(e) which permits service in the manner prescribed by the 
statutes which authorize extraterritorial service or the Federal Rules. 
However, section 2 of the Auto Dealers' Act, unlike section 12 of the 
Clayton Act, does not specifically authorize extraterritorial service. 
Thus, the provisions of the first sentence of Rule 4(e) are not rele-
vant. In the absence of statutory authorization, a plaintiff will be 
forced to rely on the second sentence of Rule 4(e) which permits 
service to be made in the manner prescribed by a state long-arm 
statute if, indeed, one exists.30 If a plaintiff should fail to lay 
venue in a state which has a long-arm statute, he will be com-
pelled to adhere to the territorial limitations of Rule 4(£)-the 
boundaries of the state in which the district court is sitting. Thus, 
if the defendant is not physically present in the state where the 
action is brought, the action will in effect be barred.31 Such a 
result, conflicting as it does with the idea that federally created 
rights should be administered on a uniform basis,32 is highly un-
desirable. One way to avoid this anomaly is to interpret provisions 
similar to section 2 as impliedly authorizing extraterritorial service. 
However, in light of the rule that service is territorial unless Con-
gress has specifically provided otherwise, 33 such an interpretation, 
regardless of its logic and obvious appeal, would at best be an act 
of judicial legislation. While it may well be that for the sake of 
achieving uniform results courts will interpret section 2 as au-
thorizing extraterritorial service of process even in the absence of 
language to that effect, it would seem that if Rule 4(e) is to remain 
in force, Congress should enact a service provision prescribing the 
permissible extent of process for causes of action arising under 
30. FED, R. Cxv. P. 4(i), which prescribes manner of service in a foreign country, 
may be invoked whenever the federal or state law referred to in Rule 4(e) permits 
service outside the United States. Again, however, Rule 4(i) could not be used in ab-
sence of a federal statute authorizing extraterritorial service unless there existed an 
appropriate state long•arm statute. 
31. See Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 
1960). 
32. See Comment, Use: of State: Statute:s by Fe:de:ral District Courts in Extrater-
ritorial Se:roice: of Proce:ss, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 751, 757 (1960). The author discusses 
the possibility of variance from state to state in the enforcement of "federally-created 
rights" under former Rule 4(d)(7). See text accompanying notes 11 &: 12 supra. This 
variance is viewed as being similar to the situation which existed under the Con-
formity Act, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), which provided that federal practice should conform 
as closely as possible to state procedure. The result under the act was general con-
fusion and lack of uniformity among the various districts. It was to ameliorate this 
type of situation and to create a single procedural standard that the Federal Rules 
were promulgated. 
33. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., !124 U.S. 439, 467 (1945); Robertson v. Railroad 
Labor Board, 268 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1925). In Schnabel v. Volkswagen of America, 
Inc., 185 F. Supp. 122 (N.D. Iowa 1960), the court noted that since the Auto Dealers' 
Act did not authorize extraterritorial service, the territorial limits of Rule 4(£) were 
applicable. 
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every federal statute. This would insure equal treatment for all 
persons suing on federal causes of action in any district court.M 
While Congress may decide that a general service provision is not 
appropriate, certainly something should be done with statutes such 
as the Auto Dealers' Act so as to insure that the federal interest 
evidenced by the passage of such legislation is protected by uni-
form application of the law. 
34. For an example of a possible federal long-arm statute applicable to all cases 
see ALI, STUDY OF nm DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL Com.TS 
§ 1314(c) (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1965): 
In civil actions in which jurisdiction is founded on section 1311 of this title 
[substantial federal interest of claim as basis of jurisdiction], service of process 
upon any defendant not found in the state where the action is brought may be 
made in any district where such defendant may be found. 
